The U-Boat War

Any book covering the U-boat war of 1939-45failures that were incredibly similar to that of the
naturally begins with the decisions by the Nazi stateAmericans in the Pacific; the Germans solved their
that ultimately ensured the defeat of the U-boats.problems quickly while the American sub crews
David Westwood's moderately-sized andsuffered from defective torpedoes for nearly three
reader-friendly volume picks up the narrative afteryears. German and Allied development of radar is
the defeat of Imperial Germany in WWI. Bannedexamined. Each side sought to gain a step in this
from operating submarines, the Germanscritical technology which led to measures and
circumvented the Versailles Treaty with a program ofcounter-measures that would swing the fight back
advising, training and contracting-out submarineand forth. When the Allies ultimately refined radar
construction for neighboring Turkey, Spain, andmidway through the war, it took away the one
Finland. As the Nazis took power and plummeted theelement that the U-boats needed most to be
world toward catastrophe, Chief of the Navy Ericheffective (and indeed, to survive); radar meant
Raeder and Commander of U-boats Karl DoenitzU-boats could not use cover of night for surface
undertook a rapid construction program that initiallyattacks. Escorts could pinpoint a surfaced U-boat
put commerce-raiding subs on equal footing withmiles away, direct an attack. When the U-boat dived
battleships. Hitler's desire to ignite the war in Sept.the escorts could strike using Asdic to track it until
1939 (due in part because opposing powers began tothe boat was sunk or driven to the surface.Doenitz
take his rhetoric and re-arming programs seriously)favored simplified design and logistical answers to the
denied Raeder the time necessary to build the 300problem of developing and constructing boats under
U-boat fleet that would be required to take on thethe press of war. The Type VII was considered his
Royal Navy. Instead, Germany had a scant 49primary weapon. It could dive quickly, had a tight
U-boats ready to begin patrol and fought a game ofturning radius, and the small size was harder to
catch-up that would doom the Kriegsmarine.Foremostdetect by Asdic. However, its dreadfully slow
on the mind of the U-boat planners was the problemunderwater speed and limited range were no match
of British ASDIC (sonar), the sound locating systemfor experienced Asdic operators. With the entry of
developed near the conclusion of the First Worldthe US in the war, the larger, longer-ranging Type IX,
War. The British Navy had such confidence in thewhich could carry more torpedoes and fuel, began to
technology that they seriously considered thesurpass the Type VII in sinkings. With the turning of
submarine threat neutralized. The German Navalthe war in May 1943, it was evident that better
Command had other ideas, namely to develop tacticsdesigns would be necessary for success against Allied
that could marginalize ASDIC and still allow aconvoys and hunter-killer groups; a "true submarine"
submarine to attack and retreat against enemywas the only hope. The Type XXI U-boat, a larger,
shipping. This included mental training to "immunize thedramatically more powerful design with more than
U-boat (crews) against the Asdic sonic transmissions".twice the underwater speed of the earlier types,
U-boats would seek conditions favorable to theirwas recognized as the German answer in the convoy
strengths: attack at night on the surface, wherewar. But shipbuilding would be hindered by shortages
Asdic would not have the power to find them; toand Allied attacks. Westwood pays out close
use the low and narrow profile of the U-boat toattention to the struggle for resources between the
avoid visual detection; and to gather en masse inArmy and Navy over steel and manpower.The war
"wolfpacks" to overwhelm the escort screens andeconomy was not running at full stretch at the
ensure maximum havoc and confusion.Another tactic,beginning of the war, and the slack began to be
employing modern radio technology to allowtaken up only when the war turned against Germany.
headquarters to concentrate and guide the U-boatsThis meant that the Type XXI program would not
to convoy positions, would work against theoverburden shipbuilding capacity if it were well
Germans. Frequently excessive use of the radioplanned, and the completion targets were not set
("chatting" with top commanders in the field of battleunrealistically high.... The pace of the program initially
is rightfully characterized by Westwood as "criminallyresulted in delays, and this, plus the strict completion
negligent" of Doenitz) allowed the British codedate of the first of the Type XXIs, led to her being
breakers at Bletchley park to read the Germans'unseaworthy, gaps in welding having wooden plugs....
Enigma signals. U-boats reporting back toThe program had approximately 50 per cent of
headquarters routinely suffered as a result of givingGerman steel production devoted to it; the general
away their position to British direction findingpriority in all matter was one which would have
teams.Doenitz was of course aware of the problemsdelighted Doenitz four, or even three, years before,
arising from U-boat radio traffic, but to have controlbut was now a matter desperation.Desperation being
he had to receive information from all boats. Hethe breeding ground for failure, the new, vastly
needed to know not only about his U-boats, butsuperior U-boats saw very little action in the last
about enemy traffic (air, naval, and merchant),stages of the war. Had the Type XXI design been
weather, and inshore, details of lights, shoals,adopted and implemented earlier in the war, there is
sandbanks, and harbor defenses. All this and morelittle doubt the Allies would have suffered great
was needed to keep BdU in the picture. To cutsetbacks.Understanding why the war was lost, what
transmission time to a minimum, the system of shortevents contributed to the defeat of the German
signals had been developed, but non-standardU-boat arm, added measurably to my knowledge.
information needed non-standard signals. He hoped toThe U-boat War devotes several sections to specific
balance the value of the information he receivedconvoy attacks and patrols--the exploits of noted
against the risk to the U-boats.Ultimately the effortsU-boat warriors--which make good reading, but it is
not only failed but contributed substantially to theWestwood's studied analysis of the tactics, planning,
destruction of the U-boat service. Allied (mainlytechnology, and logistics that elevates his book
British) intelligence routed convoy traffic around andabove mere war
away from wolfpacks. Intercepting the enemy'sBook Reviews: David Westwood
reports assisted hunter-killer groups in tracking andPublisher: Casemate Publishing
sinking U-boats in the vast oceans.The U-boat WarYear: 2005
skillfully chronicles the logistical issues and technologicalReviewer: Neal StevensNeal Stevens is the editor of
gains that worked for and against the U-boats. Earlyand contributing author of the coffee table book
in the war the Germans suffered from torpedoUnited States Submarines.