| Any book covering the U-boat war of
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| | Germans suffered from torpedo failures
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| 1939-45 naturally begins with the
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| | that were incredibly similar to that of
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| decisions by the Nazi state that
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| | the Americans in the Pacific; the Germans
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| ultimately ensured the defeat of the
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| | solved their problems quickly while the
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| U-boats. David Westwood's
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| | American sub crews suffered from
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| moderately-sized and reader-friendly
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| | defective torpedoes for nearly three
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| volume picks up the narrative after the
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| | years. German and Allied development of
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| defeat of Imperial Germany in WWI. Banned
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| | radar is examined. Each side sought to
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| from operating submarines, the Germans
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| | gain a step in this critical technology
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| circumvented the Versailles Treaty with a
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| | which led to measures and
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| program of advising, training and
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| | counter-measures that would swing the
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| contracting-out submarine construction
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| | fight back and forth. When the Allies
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| for neighboring Turkey, Spain, and
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| | ultimately refined radar midway through
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| Finland. As the Nazis took power and
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| | the war, it took away the one element
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| plummeted the world toward catastrophe,
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| | that the U-boats needed most to be
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| Chief of the Navy Erich Raeder and
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| | effective (and indeed, to survive); radar
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| Commander of U-boats Karl Doenitz
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| | meant U-boats could not use cover of
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| undertook a rapid construction program
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| | night for surface attacks. Escorts could
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| that initially put commerce-raiding subs
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| | pinpoint a surfaced U-boat miles away,
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| on equal footing with battleships.
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| | direct an attack. When the U-boat dived
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| Hitler's desire to ignite the war in
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| | the escorts could strike using Asdic to
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| Sept. 1939 (due in part because opposing
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| | track it until the boat was sunk or
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| powers began to take his rhetoric and
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| | driven to the surface.Doenitz favored
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| re-arming programs seriously) denied
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| | simplified design and logistical answers
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| Raeder the time necessary to build the
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| | to the problem of developing and
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| 300 U-boat fleet that would be required
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| | constructing boats under the press of
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| to take on the Royal Navy. Instead,
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| | war. The Type VII was considered his
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| Germany had a scant 49 U-boats ready to
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| | primary weapon. It could dive quickly,
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| begin patrol and fought a game of
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| | had a tight turning radius, and the small
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| catch-up that would doom the
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| | size was harder to detect by Asdic.
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| Kriegsmarine.Foremost on the mind of the
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| | However, its dreadfully slow underwater
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| U-boat planners was the problem of
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| | speed and limited range were no match for
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| British ASDIC (sonar), the sound locating
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| | experienced Asdic operators. With the
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| system developed near the conclusion of
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| | entry of the US in the war, the larger,
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| the First World War. The British Navy had
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| | longer-ranging Type IX, which could carry
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| such confidence in the technology that
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| | more torpedoes and fuel, began to surpass
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| they seriously considered the submarine
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| | the Type VII in sinkings. With the
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| threat neutralized. The German Naval
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| | turning of the war in May 1943, it was
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| Command had other ideas, namely to
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| | evident that better designs would be
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| develop tactics that could marginalize
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| | necessary for success against Allied
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| ASDIC and still allow a submarine to
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| | convoys and hunter-killer groups; a "true
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| attack and retreat against enemy
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| | submarine" was the only hope. The Type
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| shipping. This included mental training
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| | XXI U-boat, a larger, dramatically more
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| to "immunize the U-boat (crews) against
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| | powerful design with more than twice the
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| the Asdic sonic transmissions". U-boats
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| | underwater speed of the earlier types,
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| would seek conditions favorable to their
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| | was recognized as the German answer in
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| strengths: attack at night on the
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| | the convoy war. But shipbuilding would be
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| surface, where Asdic would not have the
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| | hindered by shortages and Allied attacks.
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| power to find them; to use the low and
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| | Westwood pays out close attention to the
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| narrow profile of the U-boat to avoid
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| | struggle for resources between the Army
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| visual detection; and to gather en masse
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| | and Navy over steel and manpower.The war
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| in "wolfpacks" to overwhelm the escort
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| | economy was not running at full stretch
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| screens and ensure maximum havoc and
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| | at the beginning of the war, and the
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| confusion.Another tactic, employing
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| | slack began to be taken up only when the
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| modern radio technology to allow
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| | war turned against Germany. This meant
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| headquarters to concentrate and guide the
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| | that the Type XXI program would not
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| U-boats to convoy positions, would work
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| | overburden shipbuilding capacity if it
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| against the Germans. Frequently excessive
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| | were well planned, and the completion
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| use of the radio ("chatting" with top
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| | targets were not set unrealistically
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| commanders in the field of battle is
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| | high.... The pace of the program
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| rightfully characterized by Westwood as
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| | initially resulted in delays, and this,
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| "criminally negligent" of Doenitz)
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| | plus the strict completion date of the
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| allowed the British code breakers at
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| | first of the Type XXIs, led to her being
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| Bletchley park to read the Germans'
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| | unseaworthy, gaps in welding having
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| Enigma signals. U-boats reporting back to
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| | wooden plugs.... The program had
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| headquarters routinely suffered as a
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| | approximately 50 per cent of German steel
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| result of giving away their position to
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| | production devoted to it; the general
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| British direction finding teams.Doenitz
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| | priority in all matter was one which
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| was of course aware of the problems
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| | would have delighted Doenitz four, or
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| arising from U-boat radio traffic, but to
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| | even three, years before, but was now a
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| have control he had to receive
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| | matter desperation.Desperation being the
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| information from all boats. He needed to
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| | breeding ground for failure, the new,
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| know not only about his U-boats, but
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| | vastly superior U-boats saw very little
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| about enemy traffic (air, naval, and
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| | action in the last stages of the war. Had
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| merchant), weather, and inshore, details
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| | the Type XXI design been adopted and
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| of lights, shoals, sandbanks, and harbor
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| | implemented earlier in the war, there is
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| defenses. All this and more was needed to
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| | little doubt the Allies would have
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| keep BdU in the picture. To cut
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| | suffered great setbacks.Understanding why
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| transmission time to a minimum, the
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| | the war was lost, what events contributed
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| system of short signals had been
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| | to the defeat of the German U-boat arm,
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| developed, but non-standard information
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| | added measurably to my knowledge. The
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| needed non-standard signals. He hoped to
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| | U-boat War devotes several sections to
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| balance the value of the information he
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| | specific convoy attacks and patrols--the
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| received against the risk to the
| |
| | exploits of noted U-boat warriors--which
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| U-boats.Ultimately the efforts not only
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| | make good reading, but it is Westwood's
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| failed but contributed substantially to
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| | studied analysis of the tactics,
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| the destruction of the U-boat service.
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| | planning, technology, and logistics that
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| Allied (mainly British) intelligence
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| | elevates his book above mere war
|
| routed convoy traffic around and away
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| | Book Reviews: David Westwood
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| from wolfpacks. Intercepting the enemy's
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| | Publisher: Casemate Publishing
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| reports assisted hunter-killer groups in
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| | Year: 2005
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| tracking and sinking U-boats in the vast
| |
| | Reviewer: Neal StevensNeal Stevens is
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| oceans.The U-boat War skillfully
| |
| | the editor of and contributing author of
|
| chronicles the logistical issues and
| |
| | the coffee table book United States
|
| technological gains that worked for and
| |
| | Submarines.
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| against the U-boats. Early in the war the
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| |
|
