| Any book covering the U-boat war of 1939-45 | | | | failures that were incredibly similar to that of the |
| naturally begins with the decisions by the Nazi state | | | | Americans in the Pacific; the Germans solved their |
| that ultimately ensured the defeat of the U-boats. | | | | problems quickly while the American sub crews |
| David Westwood's moderately-sized and | | | | suffered from defective torpedoes for nearly three |
| reader-friendly volume picks up the narrative after | | | | years. German and Allied development of radar is |
| the defeat of Imperial Germany in WWI. Banned | | | | examined. Each side sought to gain a step in this |
| from operating submarines, the Germans | | | | critical technology which led to measures and |
| circumvented the Versailles Treaty with a program of | | | | counter-measures that would swing the fight back |
| advising, training and contracting-out submarine | | | | and forth. When the Allies ultimately refined radar |
| construction for neighboring Turkey, Spain, and | | | | midway through the war, it took away the one |
| Finland. As the Nazis took power and plummeted the | | | | element that the U-boats needed most to be |
| world toward catastrophe, Chief of the Navy Erich | | | | effective (and indeed, to survive); radar meant |
| Raeder and Commander of U-boats Karl Doenitz | | | | U-boats could not use cover of night for surface |
| undertook a rapid construction program that initially | | | | attacks. Escorts could pinpoint a surfaced U-boat |
| put commerce-raiding subs on equal footing with | | | | miles away, direct an attack. When the U-boat dived |
| battleships. Hitler's desire to ignite the war in Sept. | | | | the escorts could strike using Asdic to track it until |
| 1939 (due in part because opposing powers began to | | | | the boat was sunk or driven to the surface.Doenitz |
| take his rhetoric and re-arming programs seriously) | | | | favored simplified design and logistical answers to the |
| denied Raeder the time necessary to build the 300 | | | | problem of developing and constructing boats under |
| U-boat fleet that would be required to take on the | | | | the press of war. The Type VII was considered his |
| Royal Navy. Instead, Germany had a scant 49 | | | | primary weapon. It could dive quickly, had a tight |
| U-boats ready to begin patrol and fought a game of | | | | turning radius, and the small size was harder to |
| catch-up that would doom the Kriegsmarine.Foremost | | | | detect by Asdic. However, its dreadfully slow |
| on the mind of the U-boat planners was the problem | | | | underwater speed and limited range were no match |
| of British ASDIC (sonar), the sound locating system | | | | for experienced Asdic operators. With the entry of |
| developed near the conclusion of the First World | | | | the US in the war, the larger, longer-ranging Type IX, |
| War. The British Navy had such confidence in the | | | | which could carry more torpedoes and fuel, began to |
| technology that they seriously considered the | | | | surpass the Type VII in sinkings. With the turning of |
| submarine threat neutralized. The German Naval | | | | the war in May 1943, it was evident that better |
| Command had other ideas, namely to develop tactics | | | | designs would be necessary for success against Allied |
| that could marginalize ASDIC and still allow a | | | | convoys and hunter-killer groups; a "true submarine" |
| submarine to attack and retreat against enemy | | | | was the only hope. The Type XXI U-boat, a larger, |
| shipping. This included mental training to "immunize the | | | | dramatically more powerful design with more than |
| U-boat (crews) against the Asdic sonic transmissions". | | | | twice the underwater speed of the earlier types, |
| U-boats would seek conditions favorable to their | | | | was recognized as the German answer in the convoy |
| strengths: attack at night on the surface, where | | | | war. But shipbuilding would be hindered by shortages |
| Asdic would not have the power to find them; to | | | | and Allied attacks. Westwood pays out close |
| use the low and narrow profile of the U-boat to | | | | attention to the struggle for resources between the |
| avoid visual detection; and to gather en masse in | | | | Army and Navy over steel and manpower.The war |
| "wolfpacks" to overwhelm the escort screens and | | | | economy was not running at full stretch at the |
| ensure maximum havoc and confusion.Another tactic, | | | | beginning of the war, and the slack began to be |
| employing modern radio technology to allow | | | | taken up only when the war turned against Germany. |
| headquarters to concentrate and guide the U-boats | | | | This meant that the Type XXI program would not |
| to convoy positions, would work against the | | | | overburden shipbuilding capacity if it were well |
| Germans. Frequently excessive use of the radio | | | | planned, and the completion targets were not set |
| ("chatting" with top commanders in the field of battle | | | | unrealistically high.... The pace of the program initially |
| is rightfully characterized by Westwood as "criminally | | | | resulted in delays, and this, plus the strict completion |
| negligent" of Doenitz) allowed the British code | | | | date of the first of the Type XXIs, led to her being |
| breakers at Bletchley park to read the Germans' | | | | unseaworthy, gaps in welding having wooden plugs.... |
| Enigma signals. U-boats reporting back to | | | | The program had approximately 50 per cent of |
| headquarters routinely suffered as a result of giving | | | | German steel production devoted to it; the general |
| away their position to British direction finding | | | | priority in all matter was one which would have |
| teams.Doenitz was of course aware of the problems | | | | delighted Doenitz four, or even three, years before, |
| arising from U-boat radio traffic, but to have control | | | | but was now a matter desperation.Desperation being |
| he had to receive information from all boats. He | | | | the breeding ground for failure, the new, vastly |
| needed to know not only about his U-boats, but | | | | superior U-boats saw very little action in the last |
| about enemy traffic (air, naval, and merchant), | | | | stages of the war. Had the Type XXI design been |
| weather, and inshore, details of lights, shoals, | | | | adopted and implemented earlier in the war, there is |
| sandbanks, and harbor defenses. All this and more | | | | little doubt the Allies would have suffered great |
| was needed to keep BdU in the picture. To cut | | | | setbacks.Understanding why the war was lost, what |
| transmission time to a minimum, the system of short | | | | events contributed to the defeat of the German |
| signals had been developed, but non-standard | | | | U-boat arm, added measurably to my knowledge. |
| information needed non-standard signals. He hoped to | | | | The U-boat War devotes several sections to specific |
| balance the value of the information he received | | | | convoy attacks and patrols--the exploits of noted |
| against the risk to the U-boats.Ultimately the efforts | | | | U-boat warriors--which make good reading, but it is |
| not only failed but contributed substantially to the | | | | Westwood's studied analysis of the tactics, planning, |
| destruction of the U-boat service. Allied (mainly | | | | technology, and logistics that elevates his book |
| British) intelligence routed convoy traffic around and | | | | above mere war |
| away from wolfpacks. Intercepting the enemy's | | | | Book Reviews: David Westwood |
| reports assisted hunter-killer groups in tracking and | | | | Publisher: Casemate Publishing |
| sinking U-boats in the vast oceans.The U-boat War | | | | Year: 2005 |
| skillfully chronicles the logistical issues and technological | | | | Reviewer: Neal StevensNeal Stevens is the editor of |
| gains that worked for and against the U-boats. Early | | | | and contributing author of the coffee table book |
| in the war the Germans suffered from torpedo | | | | United States Submarines. |